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THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE COMMENT IN A
CIVIL ACTION IN KENTUCKY
It is good to be zealously affected always in a good thing, says
the Apostle Paul (Gal. iv, 18). Passionate ardor for a client's cause,
eagerness for victory, the enthusiasm and interest that comes
to one imbued with the justness and righteousness of his side in a
lawsuit, will oftentimes lead an attorney in argument to overstep
the law and the evidence, get outside the record, and bring to the
attention of the jury matters having no bearing upon the questions
involved.'
I. IN oDucroN
Persuasive eloquence has long been the forte of the trial lawyer,
and tomes have been compiled of landmark, motivating summations.
The psychology of persuasion has also been a favored subject of
latter day writers. Many successful trial lawyers feel that they have
made discoveries which they should share with the profession, and
books and articles explaining methods of conducting voir dire, opening
statements, direct and cross examinations, and summations are numer-
ous.
The foregoing has been mentioned only to have the reader recall
the materials he has encountered in his readings on trial tactics and
practice. It appears to the author that most writers have neglected a
basic link in the chain between the substantive law of the case and
methods of persuasion, and that link is the law governing comments
by counsel during the course of the trial.2 The persuasiveness of an
argument is academic if the argument itself would constitute reversible
error. This fact must be kept in mind when reading an article or
participating in a seminar unless the law of all jurisdictions is expressly
considered.
As the title of this note indicates, we shall be concerned here with
the right to comment, the scope of permissible comments, and remedies
for infractions in civil actions in Kentucky. It is not the author's intent
to compare Kentucky law with that of other jurisdictions, rather the
intent is to present and attempt to interpret the many judicial pro-
nouncements that make up Kentucky's common law in this area. In
order to simplify the task as much as possible, the material has been
organized as follows:
1 Pullman Co. v. Pulliam, 187 Ky. 213, 220, 218 S.W. 1005, 1007 (1920).
2 The only articles of this type to be found are: Note, Final Argument in
Iowa, 15 DRAxE L. REv. 115 (1966); Comment, 19 ALA. L. REv. 75 (1966).
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I. BIGHrr TO COUNSEL AND IGHTrr OF COUNSEL
In Kentucky, a party to litigation has a right to act as his own
counseP or the "right" to be represented by counsel.4 He may also
have as many lawyers as are reasonably necessary to argue his case
fully and fairly and to present it to the jury.5 This "right" to counsel
is not an absolute right in the sense of Constitutional guarantees to
those accused of crimes,6 however, but merely means that a party has a
right to retain his own lawyer and to have him appear in the action.7
There are a few instances in which it is appropriate for counsel to be
appointed in civil actions, pursuant to statute.8 In the vast majority of
3 Sodousky v. McGee, 27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh) 267 (1830).
4 Id.
5 Fennell v. Frisch's Adm'r, 192 Ky. 535, 234 S.W. 198 (1921).
Parsley v. Knuckles, 346 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1961).
7 Sodousky v. McGee, 27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh) 267 (1830).8 Ky. REv. STAT. § 453.190 provides for counsel for indigents in civil actions
but the Court of Appeals has not accepted the literal interpretation and has
held that this statute merely allows court costs and a trial record in the event of
(Continued on next page)
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civil cases, the right to retain counsel will be exercised.
Once the basic right is established, the question becomes one of
valuation of the right. Of course, the right can be of little more value
than that of the attorney retained, but our concern here is with what
action the retained counsel may take. We will examine this topic on
the basic of actions during voir dire, opening statement, presentation of
evidence, and summation. Clearly, there are other functions which
counsel may perform before the court for his client, such as motions,
submission of instructions, objections, etc.; but it is those aspects of
the trial during which counsel is seen and heard by the jury which
will be considered.
A. Voir Dire
The first question concerning the right of counsel to participate in
the trial will arise at the time of selection of the jury. This phase of
the trial is controlled by the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.9 Civil
Rule 47.01(1) provides that the method of conducting voir dire ex-
aminations is left to the discretion of the trial judge.10 There appears
to be three possible methods of conducting the voir dire: exclusively
by the court; exclusively by counsel; or by both the court and
counsel.11
What then is the minimum of representation which a party is al-
lowed at this stage of the trial? It appears to be clear that the trial
judge may require counsel to remain completely silent at this stage
of the proceedings and may himself conduct the examination.12 This
is not to say, however, that counsel may be rendered ineffectual at this
stage, as Civil Rule 47.01(1) provides that the court "shall itself sub-
mit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or
their attorneys as it deems proper." (Emphasis added.) Thus, if the
trial judge should follow the locally unorthodox practice 13 of con-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
an in forma pauperis appeal. Brummett v. Knuckles, 409 S.W.2d 807 (1966);
Livingston Co. v. Crossland, 229 Ky. 733, 17 S.W.2d 1018 (1929); Black
Mountain Corp. v. Thomas, 218 Ky. 497, 291 S.W. 737 (1927).
An absolute right to counsel in a civil case has been found where the
defendant pleaded indigency and the civil action was one under which the
defendant could be imprisoned. Wright v. Crawford, 401 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1966).
9The Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated by the Court of Appeals
to take effect July 1, 1953, pursuant to An Act Relating to Rules of Pleadng,
Practice, and Procedure, and the Forms Thereof in Civil Actions and with
Limited Applications, in Criminal Proceedings, ch. 18, [1952] Ky. Acts 29,
Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 447.151-57 (1952).
10 Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 240 Ky. 1, 40 S.W.2d 356 (1931).
11 W. CLAY, 7 KIrEucKY PRACTicE 58-59 (1963).
12 London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co. v. Rufer's Adm'r, 89 Ky. 525, 12
S.W. 948 (1890).
13 This practice is common in the federal district courts but not in the
state courts,
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ducting the voir dire exclusively by himself and forbid counsel from
examining the jurors, a set of prepared questions should be submitted
to the court, and once these have been asked and answered it should
be possible to submit supplemental questions. Where all submitted
questions are deemed proper and asked, counsel will have no signi-
ficant basis for disgruntlement.
Where an individual question is refused, counsel would have a
ruling upon his motion to which no exception would be necessary.14
Where some or all questions submitted are refused (or, if submitted
by opposing counsel, accepted over objection), then counsel should,
even though Civil Rule 46 does not require it,15 point out the law and
other basis upon which he relies. This will more adequately protect
against the trial judge's decision being upheld where he was correct
for one reason yet wrong for another and where the action sought
should have been granted. Similarly, grounds for submission (or
grounds for objection) should be shown specifically for each question
which is brought into issue, for as to mixed offers and general ob-
jections the judge can do no wrong.
B. Opening Statement
Civil Rule 43.02,16 as did Civil Code section 51717 before it,
provides for a brief statement of the claim (or defense) and the
evidence to be submitted to support the contention. Again we are faced
with the discretion of the court, but the rule states that opening state-
ments shall be given except for "special reasons" for which the trial
judge may depart from the usual procedure. Apparently these "special
reasons" have never been found, or if found have never been employed,
for no cases have appeared in which denial of an opening statement
has been assigned as error. This is understandable since judges have
the same basic interests and needs as jurors for understanding what
issues are going to be tried. Where there has been no pre-trial hearing,
as is often the case, the trial judge will rely on opening statements to
familiarize himself with the case; where there has been a pre-trial
hearing, the case will probably be too important and too involved to
justify dispensing with the opening statements.
14 Ky. R. Cry. P. 46 makes exceptions unnecessary, it being sufficient that
the litigant make known to the court the course of action he desires to be taken,
whether by motion or objection.
15 Ky. R. Crv. P. 46 differs from FED. R. Civ. P. 46 on this point, the latter
requiring a statement of the law relied upon for the action sought in all cases.16 For authority for the Ky. R. Civ. P. see note 9 supra.
17 Code of Civil Practice § 517 was repealed by An Act Relating to Pleading,
Practice. and Procedure in Civil Actions and Criminal Proceedings, ch. 84, § 5,
[1952] Ky. Acts 214, 216.
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A problem arises when we consider the converse of this problem
and that is whether a party has the right not to make an opening
statement. In the case of Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v. Evans'
Administrator,18 the Court reasoned that the length or brevity of the
opening statement is primarily in the discretion of the attorney
making the statement and that he might be allowed to make a state-
ment so brief as to be no statement at all.19 There, the trial judge had
allowed the plaintiff's attorney not to make an opening statement and
it was his discretion in allowing this which was upheld. But the Court
went on to say that the trial judge could have required an opening
statement, and if an opening statement were deemed by the court to
be insufficient, a fuller statement could be required.20 While the latter
is technically dicta, this author believes it to state the correct rule
that the sufficiency of opening statements is within the discretion of the
trial judge. Counsel should honor the decision of the trial judge until
one of two extremes is reached: he is being required to state much
more than would be necessary to establish a claim for relief (or
defense); or, he is denied the right to state his case at all, and he can
offer some legitimate basis for the need for an opening statement. He
should then turn his attention toward preserving the record.
C. Summation
Although argument to the jury is controlled by the same Civil Rule
as opening statement,21 the Court of Appeals has differed in its inter-
pretation of the discretion of the trial judge. It is reversible error to
deny a party the right to have his case argued to the jury,22 but we
must not overlook certain obvious "special reasons" for the denial of
this right. Thus, arguments may properly be denied where there is
no question of fact,2 3 or where a directed verdict is appropriate,2 4 or
where the case was tried without a jury.2 5
A problem which frequently arises is the sufficiency of the time al-
lotted by the trial judge for the summations. The general rule here is
that the time to be allowed is within the discretion of the trial judge26
18129 Ky. 152, 110 S.W. 844 (1908).
10 Id. at 154, 110 S.W. at 846.
20 Id.
21 KY. R. Civ. P. 43.02.22 Wilken v. Exterkamp, 102 Ky. 143, 42 S.W. 1140 (1897).23 Harrison v. Parke, 24 Ky. (1 J. J. Marsh) 170 (1829).
24 Deering v. Halbert, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 290 (1822).25 Pozitzer v. W. R. Martin Co., 374 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 1964).26 Reed v. Craig, 244 S.W.2d 733 (1952); Asher v. Golden, 244 Ky. 56,
50 S.W.2d 3 (1932); Southern Express Co. v. Southard, 182 Ky. 492, 206 S.W.
773 (1918).
[Vol. 58
and his decision will be upheld in the absence of palpable abuse.27
Clearly, to limit counsel to an inadequate time to argue his case dif-
fers only in degree from a denial of argument altogether.2 In deciding
the time limits to be placed on summations, the court should refer to
the importance of the case,2 9 the complexity of the legal issues, the
records, the number of witnesses, 30 the degree of inconsistency of the
testimony,31 and the number and complexity of the instructions.32
Since cases differ greatly in these respects, it would be futile to attempt
to suggest actual time limitations which are either adequate or in-
adequate, and each case should be considered separately.
Despite the emphasis generally placed on voir dire and opening
statement in the "race to disclosure," summation remains as one of the
most important functions of counsel, and the real problem which
arises in connection with summations is not that of the basic right, but
that of the right to close the arguments. The right to close is important
because the party making the closing argument has the benefit of at-
tacking the previous argument, his argument will not be rebutted, and
he will have the benefit of "recency" of the "holy trinity." The rule
governing the right to close is that it is possessed by the party having
the burden of proof in the whole case,33 and failure to so award the
closing argument is reversible error.34 (It is not our purpose here to
review the vast body of law distinguishing between "burden of proof"
and "burden of going forward with the evidene&"35 or of the types of
actions in which a styled defendant can obtain the closing argument.) 36
Another problem to be encountered concerns the order of argu-
27 Asher v. Golden, 244 Ky. 56, 50 S.W.2d 3 (1932).
28Louis P. Hyman & Co. v. H. H. Snyder Co., 159 Ky. 354, 167 S.W. 146
(1914).2 Asher v. Golden, 244 Ky. 56, 50 S.W.2d 3 (1932); Southern Express Co.
v. Southard, 182 Ky. 492, 206 S.W. 773 (1918); Miller v. Barnes, 181 Ky. 473,
205 S.W. 549 (1918).
30Southern Express Co. v. Southard, 182 Ky. 492, 206 S.W. 773 (1918);
Miller v. Barnes, 181 Ky. 473, 205 S.W. 549 (1918); Moses v. Proctor Coal Co.,
166 Ky. 805, 179 S.W. 1043 (1915); Murphy v. Ray, 161 Ky. 384, 170 S.W.
946 (1914).3 1 Asher v. Golden, 244 Ky. 56, 50 S.W.2d 3 (1932); Southern Express Co.
v. Southard, 182 Ky. 492, 206 S.W. 773 (1918); Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Earls
Adm'x, 94 Ky. 368, 22 S.W. 607 (1893).32 Miller v. Barnes, 181 Ky. 473, 205 S.W. 549 (1918); Moses v. Proctor
Coal Co., 166 Ky. 805, 179 S.W. 1043 (1915); Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Earls
Adm'x, 94 Ky. 368, 22 S.W. 607 (1893).
33 K. R. Civ. P. 43.02(5).34 Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co. v. City of Louisville, 97 Ky. 548, 31 S.W. 130
(1895). But see O'Connor v. Henderson Bridge Co., 95 Ky. 633, 27 S.W. 251(1894)
3 5 For general distinctions see Lawson, The Law of Presumptions: A Look
at Confusion, Kentucky Style, EG Ky. L.J. 7 (1968); Lawson, The Order of
Presentation as a Factor in Jury Persuasion, 56 Ky. LJ. 523 (1967).
30 See 18 K=xrrucKY DsiGsT 271-82 [Trial Key 25].
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ment when there are multiple parties. Here it is necessary to look to
pleadings in order to determine the burden of proof.3 7 If all parties on
a side appear to have equal rights to close, then the matter of order
is probably within the discretion of the trial judge.3 8
IH. PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO SPEcIFc STAGrs OF TmrAL
A. Scope of Voir Dire
As stated in Sizemore v. Commonwealth,9
The purpose of voir dire is to determine whether a juror possesses
necessary qualifications, whether he has prejudged the case, and
whether his mind is free from prejudice or bias so as to enable
a party to ascertain whether a cause for challenge exists, and to
ascertain whether it is expedient to exercise the right of peremptory
challenge.40
In order to discover any incapacity or prejudice it is necessary to
familiarize the veniremen with the nature of the case and the parties
concerned. This has led to the practice of making voir dire one of the
most important phases of any trial, as it is here that claims and de-
fenses may first be stated and the mental "set" of jurors first established.
It is here that "primacy," the race to disclosure, really begins, and for
this reason it is important to consider the latitude allowed counsel
in conducting the voir dire.
Counsel will be allowed to state, in general terms, the transaction
out of which the claim arose.41 This is necessary to test a venireman's
knowledge of the case4 2 and any conclusions which he may have
formed as to its merits.
Voir dire is the proper time to test the jurors" acquaintances with
parties, 43 attorneys, 44 and witnesses45 to the action, and this is usually
done mechanically at the beginning.
37 Blackburn v. Beverly, 272 Ky. 346, 114 S.W.2d 98 (1938).38 Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Kelley, 301 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1957); Martin v.
Ackman, 270 Ky. 640, 110 S.W.2d 437 (1938).
39 306 S.W.2d 833 (Ky. 1957).
40 Id. at 834 [quoting from 50 C.J.S. Juries § 273 (1947).]41 Apparently denial of this privilege has never been assigned as error in
Kentucky. See Gossett v. Commonwealth, 426 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1968), where a
statement of the nature of the cause by the trial judge went unquestioned.4 2 Gossett v. Commonwealth, 426 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1968); Messer v. Com-
monwealth, 297 Ky. 772, 181 S.W.2d 438 (1944); Schreiber v. Roser, 258 Ky.
340, 80 S.W.2d 1 (1935).
43 Horton v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1951); Olympic Realty
Co. v. Kamer, 283 Ky. 432, 141 S.W.2d 293 (1940); Schreiber v. Roser, 258 Ky.
340, 80 S.W.2d 1 (1935); Stone v. Monticello Const. Co., 135 Ky. 659, 117
S.W. 369 (1909).
44 Seiler v. Lawrence, 312 Ky. 857, 230 S.W.2d 70 (1950).45 Baker v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.2d 119 (Ky. 1959); Olympic Realty
Co. v. Kamer, 283 Ky. 432, 141 S.W.2d 293 (1940).
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Ordinarily, knowledge of the backgrounds of jurors will be desired
and, within reasonable limits, these questions may be asked 46 of the
jurors individually.47 It should be remembered that questions need not
seek only answers which would constitute cause for striking, but may
call for any information pertinent to an informed exercise of peremp-
tory challenges. 48
Most text writers recommend testing the jurors' reception of a
party's case through hypothetical questions which assume facts to be
proved. An affirmative response to a question such as, "Will you fol-
low the law of the case as given to you in the instructions?" will be al-
most automatic, and probably as meaningless as the question appeared
to the juror. But questions such as, "The law of this state is that one
whose negligence contributed to the accident, no matter how slightly,
may not recover. If the evidence should show that the plaintiff was
but one percent at fault here, are you willing to turn this plaintiff
away without any recovery whatsoever, no matter how badly he may
have been injured?" will more accurately test the jurors' capacity to
sit. Here he is forced to respond to a realistic situation which is ex-
pected to arise. If the juror answers that he could not totally deny the
plaintiff, then he is saying in essence that he will not honor his oath
and apply the law of the case. If he replies that he would follow the
instructions, even in so difficult a situation, then counsel has elicited a
valuable promise which he will call upon the jurors, in closing state-
ment, to keep.
Having stated that hypothetical questions are the desired manner
of testing the jurors' subjective capacity to sit, we are now in the
unenviable position of being unable to cite any authority which ex-
pressly approves hypothetical questions. The principal cases on the
subject indicate that the Kentucky Court does not approve of explicit
hypotheticals, preferring more formal voir dire questions.49
In the case of Harrell v. Commonwealth50 the Court stated:
Without detailing the questions propounded it is sufficient to say
that each of the controversial questions propounded either at-
tempted to state the case, to instruct on the law peculiar to the case
or inquire into the jurors' knowledge of that law. We have con-
46Lightfoot v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 151, 219 S.W.2d 984 (1949).
47 Alexander v. Jones, 249 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. 1952); Apkins v. Commonwealth,
148 Ky. 662, 147 S.W. 376 (1912).
48 Olympic Realty Co. v. Kamer, 283 Ky. 432, 141 S.W.2d 293 (1940);
Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 969 (1933).
4 Mercer v. Commonwealth, 330 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1959); Elliott v. Com-
monwealth, 290 Ky. 502, 161 S.W.2d 633 (1941); Jones v. Commonwealth, 14
Ky. L. Rptr. 223, 19 S.W. 844 (1892).
50 328 S.W.2d 531 (Ky. 1959).
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cluded that the questions were improper and that the court did
not err in his ruling.51
The questions propounded and denied by the trial court were in fact
quite confusing and seldom "pure" in the sense that each could be
definitely categorized. 52 For its general statement of law, the Court
cited Corpus Juris Secundum for the following:
[I]t is not proper to propound hypothetical questions purporting
to embody testimony that is intended to be submitted, regardless
of whether or not they correctly epitomize the testimony. Thus
it is not competent to examine jurors as to how they would act
or decide in certain contingencies, or in case the court should
give certain instructions, or in case certain evidence or a certain
state of evidence should be developed on the trial, but there are
decisions in which it has been held proper to ask a juror whether
he will follow the instructions of the court, where no attempt is
made to state in advance what the instructions or the facts will
be, so as to pledge the juror in advance to render a certain verdict
on a given state of law and fact ....
* * * It has been held improper to inform prospective jurors
of the law applicable to the case, as a basis for questioning, or
generally to propound questions which call for the opinion of the
juror on questions of law, or his understanding of the meaning
of legal terms and expressions .... 53
It is indeed difficult to reconcile the judicial pronouncements with
what is believed to be the general practice of the profession, as it is
difficult to conceptualize hypothetical questions which deal with
neither the law nor facts of the case, and which do not attempt to
anticipate the instructions of the court. Perhaps there is an implicit
distinction between "general hypotheticals" such as the preceeding
examples, and hypotheticals which are peculiar to the case, the
emphasis in practice being placed upon the effect of the questions
rather than the form chosen. 4 We simply point out that this is an area
requiring development by the Court of Appeals, and shall look to the
profession to frame the issues for the Court.
B. Opening Statement
Civil Rule 43.02(1) states, "The plaintiff must briefly state his
claim and the evidence by which he expects to sustain it." Rule
43.02(2) states that "The defendant must then briefly state his de-
r) Id. at 532-33.52 Brief for Appellant at 20-22, Harrell v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 531
(Ky. 1959).
53 50 C.J.S. Juries § 275(2), at 1142-43 (1947).
54 See Commonwealth v. GeM, 282 Pa. 434, 128 A. 77 (1925).
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fense and the evidence he expects to offer in support of it."
These rules deserve to be read carefully because they contain
within themselves the established interpretation. First there is the
statement of the claim or defense. A claim or defense is an ultimate
fact or fact pattern to be governed by the legal theory of the case
which is given to the jury in the instructions. In most cases the claim
will be based upon the theory of negligence, and the defense will be
based upon the theory of contributory negligence. Opening statements
are not an occasion for a discourse on the legal theory of the case,55
although it is frequently desirable to state the nature of the claim or
defense and its elements.
The second aspect of these rules is that the statement shall in-
clude the evidence which the party expects to submit to sustain his
contention. Evidence will be testimony of witnesses and physical exi-
bits which will be probatively factual in nature. Thus, counsel must
make his statement of the ultimate facts he will prove by stating the
probative facts he will submit for the jury's consideration.
We must always keep in mind the distinction between ultimate
facts and probative facts and that there is a theoretical, and frequently
actual, gap between them. This is because even though both may be
stated, one as the claim and the other as the evidence, the gap can-
not be bridged in opening statement. This is argument of the case, a
function of counsel reserved solely for summation.56
Where counsel attempts to argue the law of the case and to apply
it to the facts he will be vulnerable to an objection. It does not appear,
however, that argument of the case in opening statement can be the
basis for reversal. In Colston's Administrator v. Cincinnati, N.O. &
T.P. Ry. Co.5 7 an argument was considered which evidently would
have been proper had it been made in summation. The Court refused
to reverse on this basis, holding that it was at most harmless error.
Problems which arise in making an opening statement are ana-
logous to those which arise upon presentation of evidence. If evidence
will not be accepted when offered it is not a legitimate topic for
discussion in the opening statement.58 An objection may be made at the
time counsel states that he will introduce the evidence, 59 and such an
55 Colston's Adm'r v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co., 253 Ky. 512, 69 S.W.2d
1072 (1934).5 Id.
57 Id.58Turpin v. Scrivner, 297 Ky. 365, 178 S.W.2d 971 (1944); Star Furniture
Co. v. Holland, 273 Ky. 617, 117 S.W.2d 603 (1938); Louisville Gas Co. v.
Kentucky Heating Co., 132 Ky. 435, 111 S.W. 374 (1908).59 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 37 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Ky. 1941);
Standard Oil Co. v. Leach, 138 Ky. 594, 128 S.W. 885 (1910).
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objection, if sustained, should have at least two effects upon the course
of the trial. First, it will serve the immediate purpose of cutting off
statement on an improper subject. Secondly, it should force the pro-
ponent of the evidence to offer it by merely calling the witness and
making an offer, thus cutting off a second, and possibly more
damaging, opportunity to "ring the bell."°0
Another problem of opening statement is avoiding a directed ver-
dict as a result of fatal admissions. A directed verdict may be entered
at the close of an opening statement if it is clear that a party will be
unable to prove facts essential to recovery, or to disprove facts
fatal to recovery.61 Before making such a decision the trial judge should
allow counsel to make a fuller statement or to explain any statment
made. A verdict should not be directed based upon misunderstanding
or inadvertence of counsel.62 Nor should a verdict be directed based
upon mere insufficiency of the opening statements, but only upon ad-
missions.63 Statements are to be considered in the same manner as
pleadings upon a motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim for
relief: the statement should be construed in favor of the maker,6 and
the statement of the opposing party should not be taken as true.05
Occasionally a trial judge will indicate to counsel that if the evidence
to be presented was correctly and fully stated, he will be forced to
direct a verdict. Instances where this should be done are where the
trial promises to be lengthy and the claim or defense, or the admis-
sibility of necessary evidence, is based upon uncertain law. In such
an instance counsel have often agreed that opening statements may
be taken as evidence and the verdict directed.66 This is to avoid the
60 The reference to "bell ringing" is a reference to asking leading questions
to vitiate the effect of the inevitable objection and admonition. Thus it is said
that "you cannot unring a bell" or that "you can pull out the nail but you
can't pull out the hole." An admonition to disregard a leading question is fre-
quently no more effective than an admonition to "count to ten without thinking
of a rabbit."
This type of conduct is condemned by the new ABA CANONS OF PRoFssIoNAL.
REsPoNsm=rrY, Ethical Consideration 7-25 (1970), and by case lav. Louisville
& N. R.R. Co. v. Payne, 133 Ky. 539, 118 S.W. 352 (1909); Marcum v. Hargis,
104 Ky. L. Rptr. 1117, 104 S.W. 693 (1907).
61 Baer v. Case Plumbing Mfg. Co., 423 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1968); Hill v.
Kisseiring, 310 Ky. 483, 220 S.W.2d 858 (1949); Payne v. Louisville By. Co.,
294 Ky. 160, 171 S.W.2d 253 (1943).
62 Tinsley v. Majorana, 240 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1951); Carter v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 272 Ky. 392, 114 S.W.2d 496 (1938).
63 Baker v. Case Plumbing Mfg. Co., 423 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1968); Riley v.
Hornbuckle, 366 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. 1963).
64 Hill v. Kisselring, 310 Ky. 483, 220 S.W.2d 858 (1949); c.f. Raco Corp.
v. Edwards, 272 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1954).
65 Payne v. Louisville & N. 1R.11. Co., 294 Ky. 160, 171 S.W.2d 253 (1943).
66 Co-De Coal Co. v. Combs, 325 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1959); Payne v. Louisville
& N. R.R. Co., 294 Ky. 160, 171 S.W.2d 253 (1943).
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expense and time required to actually present the evidence, yet pre-
serves a record upon which to base an appeal.
In the recent case of Samuels v. Spangler,67 counsel for plaintiff
made an opening statement which showed the plaintiff to be contri-
butorily negligent. The trial judge deemed the statement insufficient
and called the parties into chambers where counsel for plaintiff was
asked whether he was able to state facts constituting a claim for relief.
When the plaintiffs counsel stated that he had fully stated the case, a
verdict was directed for the defendant. On appeal plaintiff argued
that he had made no fatal admission upon which a verdict could have
been directed. The Court declined to consider the statements as show-
ing contributory negligence as a matter of law since the statements
were not unequivocal."8 The Court proceeded, however, to consider
the direction of the verdict as the granting of summary judgment (the
conference in chambers revealed that there was no fact in dispute)
and affirmed the lower court's action.69
C. Problems Relating to Presentation of Evidence
Soliloquies and asides are, of course, improper when evidence is
being presented and are a signal of improper comment. Objections to
this type of misconduct will usually be well taken and little analysis
would be of value. Aside from intentional misconduct, objection may
also be made to the subject matter of the comment in many cases.
Counsel is frequently faced with the dilemma of preserving the
record for appeal without creating a ground for reversal. This prob-
lem is presented where a party has evidence which he would like to
introduce but which he believes the trial judge will rule (or has ruled)
inadmissible. To fail to pursue the line at all would be dereliction, for
his fears may be unfounded" or the opposing party may fail to ob-
ject.71 But to persist after an adverse ruling would be misconduct 72
and cost any verdict thereby gained.73 There is little need to involve
ourselves with theoretical distinctions on this point for the proper
practice is clearly established.
If a proponent has some reasonable belief that his evidence should
67441 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1969).
68 Id. at 131.
69 Id.
70 Standard Oil Co. v. Leach, 138 Ky. 594, 128 S.W. 885 (1910).
71 Phillips v. Green, 194 Ky. 254, 238 S.W. 742 (1922).72 Bergman v. Solomon, 143 Ky. 581, 136 S.W. 1010 (1911); Standard Oil
Co. v. Leach, 138 Ky. 594, 128 S.W. 885 (1910); Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v.
Payne, 133 Ky. 539, 118 S.W. 352 (1909).73 Note the omnipresent requirement of causation. Louisville & N. R.R. Co.
v. Payne, 133 Ky. 539, 118 S.W. 352 (1909).
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be admissible,74 he should proceed upon that theory and treat it no
differently from clearly admissible evidence. If no objection is raised
or if an objection is overruled, then no problem will arise, except
perhaps on a motion for a-new trial or on an appeal. If the objection
is sustained, then counsel should have his witness make an offer of
his answer out of hearing of the jury in order to preserve the error.
Thereafter, he should proceed to call his other witnesses, state that he
wishes to ask the same questions, and have his witnesses make the
same offers of answers. This is in conformity with the literal in-
terpretation of Civil Rule 48.10, as the Rule specifies that the witness
is to make a specific offer of his answer to the court and makes no
provision for avowals by counsel. There appear to be no recent cases
holding that an avowal by counsel is insufficient, and recent cases
intimate that either a specific offer by the witness or an avowal by the
attorney would suffice,7 r but it would be far wiser for counsel to
conform to the interpretation of the official comments76 on the Civil
Rules and to have his witness make the offer. This procedure should
afford the offeror the most protection possible under the adverse cir-
cumstances of a sustained objection. To do less may cost a new trial;
to do more may cost a favorable verdict.
A common problem of examination of witnesses is "unringing the
bell," or removing the prejudicial effect of improper questions, or
questions calling for improper testimony. Ordinarily these questions
cannot be anticipated and the objection must come after the jury
has heard the reference. In most cases the sustaining of the objection
and an admonition to the jury will be the only relief to which the
objector will be entitled.77 There are, however, instances in which
such questions will necessitate a mistrial. Examples of these are where
there are repeated references78 to those matters upon which comment
will usually result in irradicable error, such as insurance,70 settlement
offers, 80 etc. Our previous discussion of introduction of legally
74 Bergman v. Solomon, 143 Ky. 581, 136 S.W. 1010 (1911), and Louisville
& N. R.R. Co. v. Payne, 133 Ky. 539, 118 S.W. 352 (1909), indicate that the
offeror of clearly inadmissible and prejudicial evidence is not even entitled to a
"first bite."75 Eilers v. Eilers, 412 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1967); Commonwealth v. Jewell,
405 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. 1966); Kentucky Stone Co. v. Gaddie, 396 S.W.2d 337(1965).
76W. CLAY, 7 ICEruc:v PACTiCE 29 (1963).77 Burdon v. Burdon's Adm'r, 225 Ky. 480, 9 S.W.2d 220 (1928); Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Brians Adm'r, 224 Ky. 419, 6 S.W.2d 491 (1928).7 8 Dale v. Peden, 252 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1952); Stearns Coal & Lumber Co.
v. Williams, 177 Ky. 698, 198 S.W. 54 (1917).
79 Helton v. Prater's Adm'r, 272 Ky. 574, 114 S.W.2d 1120 (1938).
80 Wolf Creek Collieries Co. v. Davis, 441 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1969).
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questionable evidence applies equally to this problem, and it appears
that the offeror is entitled to his "first bite."
A closely related problem is the nonresponsive answer which re-
veals irrelevant matters. Here the courts have often looked to who
made the statement in an effort to determine whether it was given in-
nocently or maliciously.8' Thus, a plaintiff who discloses that he
"made a statement to the defendant's insurance man" is more likely
to cause a mistrial than a mere witness who makes the same answer.82
Ordinarily, it should not be error for a defendant to make the same
disclosure, this logically being within his discretion,8 3 but the converse
should be true where counsel for plaintiff has discreetly elicited the
answer.8
Improper questions and answers may be considered by the
court with regard to other misconduct on the same subject in order to
discover a design or plan to inject improper considerations into the
trial. Thus, in Helton v. Praters Administrator,85 what was probably
a permissible voir dire question on interests in an insurance company
was considered in relation to a later comment on the same topic in
finding a concerted plan to introduce improper considerations into
the trial.
D. Scope of Summation
Counsel is given wide latitude in arguing his case to the jury, and
in doing so he may argue facts as they appear in the record, common
knowledge, and reasonable deductions therefrom.86 The first element
8 1 Terminal Transport Co. v. Berry, 217 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1954).
82 Compare Kauf-man-Straus Co. v. Short, 311 Ky. 78, 223 S.W.2d 367
(1949), and Turpin v. Scrivner, 297 Ky. 365, 178 S.W.2d 971 (1944), with
Marsee v. Johnson, 260 Ky. 615, 86 S.W.2d 299 (1935), and Chambers v.
Hawkins, 233 y. 211, 25 S.W.2d 363 (1930).
83 locally prominent defense attorney has stated that when he goes to
a rural area to try a case he assumes that the jury will associate him with
an insurance company. This has led him on occasion to announce the fact and
appeal to the jurors for a fair trial.8 4 Hall v. Ratliff, 312 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1958); Stott v. Hinkle, 286 Ky. 143
150 S.W.2d 655 (1941); Wilson v. Deegan's Adm'r, 282 Ky. 547, 139 S.W.2d
58 (1940).85272 Ky. 574, 114 S.W.2d 1120 (1938).
86 Commonwealth v. Re ppert, 421 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1967); City of New-
port v. Maytum, 342 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1961); Bruner v. Gordon, 309 Ky. 29,
214 S.W.2d 703 (1948); Coomb's Adrr v. Vibbert, 289 Ky. 463, 158 S.W.2d
957 (1942); Monohan v. Grayson Co. Sup. Co., 245 Ky. 781, 54 S.W.2d 311
(1932); Shelley v. Chilton's Adm'r, 236 Ky. 221, 32 S.W.2d 974 (1931); City
of Providence v. Young, 227 Ky. 690, 13 S.W.2d 1022 (1929); Wells v. King,
219 Ky. 201, 292 S.W. 777 (1927); Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Vaughn's Admr,
183 Ky. 829, 210 S.W. 938 (1919); Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Baker's Adm'r, 183
Ky. 785, 210 S.W. 674 (1919); Ross v. Kohler, 163 Ky. 583, 174 S.W. 36
S1915); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. By. Co. v. Martin, 154 Ky. 348, 157 S.W. 710
1913); Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 132 Ky. 435, 11 S.W. 374
1908); Hurst v. Williams, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 658, 102 S.W. 1176 (1907); Warren
v. Nash, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 479, 68 S.W. 658 (1902).
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in the rule stated is argument on the record. This includes the
testimony of witnesses and physical evidence actually introduced.
Counsel must never forget that his statements in opening statement,
while examining witnesses, or during summation, are not evidence and
can support neither argument nor a verdict.8 7 Similarly, he must re-
member that the best evidence in the world is useless unless produced
at trial,s8 and this means the trial which is then being held.8 9 It is
surprising how frequently these simple axioms are forgotten, and a
lawyer finds himself in summation unable to argue his best evidence
simply because he forgot to offer it.
The converse is also true. If one does not wish opposing counsel to
argue incompetent evidence then he must make timely objection to
its admission into the record. 0
It is upon this basis that we should test what might be called un-
sworn testimony which is not in the record but which may nonethe-
less be true. An excellent example of this is found in Berger v. Standard
Oil Company,9 1 in which counsel stated in summation his thoughts and
what he had done in getting oil samples tested. Of course, none of
this was in evidence.
Going but one step further, lawyers occasionally make such state-
ments as rank hearsay. The 1969 case of Adams v. Flora9 2 is an excel-
lent example of this technique. The attorney there stated:
... I have had no less than 6 people who have no interest in this
case whatsoever, who have told me that if Lillie Howard's will
is broken-
Who have told me that if you break this will every will that has
been written by any person 65 years old that doesn't suit some of
the kinfolks-
... [AInd some of you are about 65 years old . . . .[T]hen
you were willing for a jury to come in and say you didn't like the
way that was written we are going to give it to the legal heirs.
(Italics omitted).93
87 Co-De Coal Co. v. Combs, 325 S.W.2d 78 (1958).
88 Wilson v. Little, 293 S.W.2d 715 (Ky. 1956). An interesting example is
Stacy v. Williams, 253 Ky. 353, 69 S.W.2d 697 (1934), in which the plaintiff sat
with his injured leg exposed as counsel referred to it in argument. This was
improper as the leg itself was not in evidence and counsel had failed to offer
photographs.8 9 Triplett v. Napier, 286 S.W.2d 87 (1956).90 Norton v. Winstead, 218 Ky. 26, 290 S.W. 1034 (1927).
91 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245 (1907).
92445 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1969).
931d. at 421.
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This statement of hearsay opinion not in the record was condemned
and, largely due to the lack of an admonition, the Court felt com-
pelled to reverse.
The second element of the rule is "common knowledge." Common
knowledge includes matters of learning, experience, history and facts
of which judicial notice may be taken. 94 In Shelley v. Chilton's Ad-
ministrator,5 it was held that this included current history and facts
concerning public figures. The key to common knowledge appears to
be "facts of which judicial knowledge may be taken." In Common-
wealth v. Gabhart,90 an appeal to test the sufficiency of an indictment,
the Court of Appeals quoted approvingly from Newman's Pleading and
Practice07 that:
'The judicial notice here referred to not only embraces the general
laws or principles of jurisprudence, which of course need not be
stated or argued in a pleading, but also includes facts of public
notoriety. It will frequently be difficult to distinguish those things
the notoriety of which will justify the court in knowing them
judicially from those of which proof will be required. No general
rule can be laid down on the subject; but it may perhaps with
propriety be said that the courts will judicially know all facts
affecting the public at large which are known or should be known
by the generality of the people of the state. If the memory of the
judge is at fault, he will refer to such documents as may be
deemed worthy of confidence. To this may be added such facts
as are referred to in the general statutes of the State; all of which
are presumed to be known to the people and judges of the Com-
monwealth.'98
All that need be added to the language of the Court and of Judge
Newman is that the attorney who finds himself estopped from arguing
outside the record may be able to justify his comments as mere state-
ments of facts of common knowledge. 9
The third element of the rule governing the scope of argument to
the jury is that of "reasonable deductions from the evidence." It is
permissible, and expected, that counsel will argue to the jury an
interpretation of the evidence most favorable to his client.10 0 Here it
is necessary to carefully distinguish between stating the evidence (as
94 Shelley v. Chilton's Adm'r, 236 Ky. 221, 32 S.W.2d 974 (1930).
Or, Id.
90 160 Ky. 32, 169 S.W. 514 (1914).
OTJ. NmvmAN, PLEADING & PRACTCE § 210 (1908).98 Commonwealth v. Gabhart, 160 Ky. 32, 34-35, 169 S.W. 514, 515 (1914).
99 Note the attempt to do this in Louisville By. Co. v. Farmer, 182 Ky. 368,
206 S.W. 619 (1918).100 Rakestraw v. Sebree Deposit Bank, 189 Ky. 668, 225 S.W. 506 (1920);
Kimbrough v. Lexington City Nat1 Bank, 150 Ky. 336, 150 S.W. 325 (1912);
Worthington v. Miller's Adm'r, 4 Ky. L. Rptr. 252, 11 Ky. Opin. 708 (1882).
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it appears in the record) and stating an interpretation of the same
evidence. If counsel purports to state the evidence and misstates it, he
is subject to rebuke from the trial judge,101 even in the absence of
an objection.10 2 But if he correctly states the evidence and then goes
on to state its significance, he will be immune from reprimand. This
will be true even though the logical connection is unsound,103 for this
is a decision for the jury to make.
As the reader must realize, it is impossible to state what will or
will not be an acceptable or logical deduction from the evidence. It
is the infinite combinations of evidence that make law so complicated
and profitable. Each argument must be examined in the context of
the particular case.
IV. ThE BAsic OBJECTIONS TO CoUmEsNTs
The objections to comments made by counsel in the course of a
trial are as difficult to categorize and rationalize as objections to the
admission of evidence in general. Indeed, in most instances which have
arisen, they are the same. Probably the most common objection is
irrelevancy, here including immateriality, and it is this standard which
dictates that we ordinarily exclude evidence of: insurance; settlement
offers; religion or race of a party; character of parties, witnesses, and,
especially, attorneys; rights of a party to appeal a judgment; prior
litigation; and class affiliations. Of course, any of these topics may be-
come an issue in a particular case and thereby become relevant and
the subject of legitimate comment, but most often they will not.
Occasionally the objection to evidence is that it is incompetent,
and the ground for exclusion should control any comment by counsel.
The same analysis should apply no matter what the particular grounds
for objection to admissibility of evidence of the same subject should
be.
There are instances in which evidence of the subject of a comment
would be admissible but where a comment is not. The most obvious
example of this is where evidence was available but not introduced
at trial and therefore not made a part of the record. 04 This leads us
101 Moss v. Mittel, 253 Ky. 504, 69 S.W.2d 1046 (1934); Brandenburg v.
Addison, 221 Ky. 442, 298 S.W. 1091 (1927).
1020wensboro Shovel & Tool Co. v. Moore, 154 Ky. 431, 157 S.W. 1121
(1913).
103 Kentucky & I.T. R.R. Co. v. Becker's Adm'r, 185 Ky. 169, 214 S.W. 900
(1919).
104 See, e.g., Wilson v. Little, 293 S.W.2d 715 (Ky. 1956); Louisville &
N. R.R. Co. v. Hull, 113 Ky. 561, 68 S.W. 433 (1902).
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to the reason for impropriety of a comment most often given by the
Court, that the comment is not upon matters shown by the record or
that it goes outside the record. 10 5 This is a broad ground for objection
because it covers evidence whether admissible or not, but it should not
be preferred if other grounds for objection are available. The reason
for this, especially where evidence of the subject of the comment is
inadmissible, is that it requires the court to divert its attention from
fairly well settled rules of evidence to considerations of the particular
record before it and the propriety of inferences drawn from that re-
cord, a much more nebulous and difficult area. This is simply to say
that counsel should choose the most concrete objection available when-
ever an objection is to be made.
A third situation in which comment will be deemed improper is
where the subject of the comment was admitted into the record yet
is of no probative value to the issues of the case, e.g., the number of
children left by the deceased in a wrongful death action. Testimony
regarding children, or a widow, is technically irrelevant but will be
admitted.'0 6 But to overemphasize the fact by redundant testimony and
argument to the jury is improper and may require reversal, e.g., to
suggest that the needs of the widow and children is the correct measure
of damages is an attack on the instructions.
A similar problem is where evidence is admitted for one particular
purpose and is thereafter attempted to be used for another and im-
proper purpose. An example of this is Croley v. Huddleston07 where
evidence was admitted to impeach a witness, and by admonition
restricted to this purpose, but which counsel attempted to argue as
substantive evidence.
V. SpEcnmc PEoBLEm AEAs
A. Affidavits For Continuance
Rule 43.03 of our Rules of Civil Procedure as did its predecessor,
Civil Code section 315, allows a party to a civil action a continuance
where material evidence cannot be produced. Ordinarily, the evidence
sought will be the testimony of a witness. In order to obtain such a
continuance, the moving party must submit an affidavit showing the
facts the affant believes the witness will prove, the materiality of the
facts, that the afflant believes the facts to be true, 08 and that a sub-
105 See Scope of Summation section HI D, supra.
10 6 McCoy v. Carter, 323 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1959).
107 301 Ky. 58, 192 S.W.2d 717 (1946)
10s Harlan-Central Coal Co. v. Gross, 298 Ky. 540, 183 S.W.2d 550 (1944).
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poena was issued and placed in the hands of the sheriff a reasonable
time prior to trial.10 9
This same rule permits the opposing party a voice in the decision
whether to grant the continuance sought, and, except for unusual cir-
cumstances, 110 he may force the moving party to trial by agreeing that
the affidavit may be read into evidence as the deposition of the missing
witness,"' subject to objections to relevancy, materiality, and com-
petency. Naturally, this will encourage the party seeking the con-
tinuance to make the affidavit as favorable to his position as propriety
will allow.
Where a party has successfully resisted a motion for a con-
tinuance by agreeing that an affidavit may be read as a deposition,
the moving party will offer it into evidence and have it read. There-
after, it may be considered as no different than any other evidence
and may be commented upon in the same manner." 2 Frequently, how-
ever, counsel have been moved to attack not only the truth of the
"testimony" therein, but the good faith of the affiant as well. An ex-
ample of this type of comment is found in the 1913 case of Madison-
ville, H. & E. R.R. Co. v. Allen, 11 where counsel who had agreed that
the affidavit be read stated in summation that,
Mr. Browder is an expert in writing affidavits, and he goes out
and writes a long affidavit to be read as the deposition of the
absent witnesses, and be puts so much in that affidavit and so much
that is ridiculous that we are forced to admit it in order to get a
trial.114
Where such remarks have been made, and the instances have been
numerous, the courts have consistently held them to be error.115 This
seems only fair since the party forcing the unwilling litigant to trial
should not also be able to deny him his evidence, and the Court has
recognized that such comments have this effect.116 The objection that
109 North River Ins. Co. v. Dyche, 163 Ky. 271, 173 S.W. 784 (1915).
110 Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Poulos, 228 Ky. 446, 15 S.W.2d 271 (1929);
Madisonville, H. & E. R.R. Co. v. Allen, 152 Ky. 706, 154. S.W. 5 (1913);
Troendle Coal Co. v. Morgan Coal, Coke & Mining Co., 114 S.W. 312 (Ky.
1908); Langdon-Creasy Co. v. Rouse, 139 Ky. 647, 72 S.W. 1113 (1903).
11 Farris v. Evans, 289 Ky. 418, 158 S.W.2d 941 (1942).
i12Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Roundtree, 292 Ky. 59, 165 S.W.2d 973 (1942);
Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Diehmnan, 259 Ky. 320, 82 S.W.2d 350 (1935).
113 152 Ky. 706, 154 S.W. 5 (1913).
114Id. at 710, 154 S.W. at 7.
115 Wagner v. Emmett, 280 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1955); National Surety Marine
Ins. Corp. v. Wheeler, 257 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1953); Boden v. Rogers, 249
S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1952); Gunterman v. Cleaver, 204 Ky. 62, 263 S.W. 683(1924); Madisonville, H. & E. R.R. Co. v. Allen, 152 Ky. 706, 154 S.W. 5 (1913).116Boden v. Rogers. 249 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1952); Whittaker v. Thomberry,
306 Ky. 830, 209 S.W.2d 448 (1948).
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the affidavit is that of the counsel for the opposing side and not that
of the witness is one that is waived in resisting the motion for con-
tinuance.
This is not to say that no comment may be made concerning the
affidavit. It becomes a part of the record 1 7 and is subject to the same
comments as other evidence, and inconsistencies between the affidavit
and other evidence may be argued. 118 It should be permissible to show
through other witnesses that the missing witness would be biased or
that he had no opportunity to observe, or to impeach him in some
other manner.1 9
This brings us to an important practical consideration: May the
acceptance of the affidavit as a deposition be conditioned upon the
stipulation of other facts which would tend to impeach? For example,
may the party resisting the motion for continuance insist upon the
inclusion in the affidavit that the missing witness is a friend, relative,
or employee of the party making the motion where the fact is in-
disputable? One's sense of fairness says "yes," but the answer should
be "no." This is a consideration which the opposing party must take
into account when deciding whether or not to accept the affidavit. If
it is necessary that he impeach the witness and he has no other means
of doing so, he should agree to the continuance. The only situation in
which a case such as this could reach the Court of Appeals would be
where the trial judge forced the moving party to amend his affidavit
to include such facts, and the moving party lost in the trial court.
Such a situation has not arisen in Kentucky.
B. Per Diem Calculations20
Courts of various jurisdictions have reached different conclusions
on whether counsel should be allowed to suggest a value for daily
pain and suffering and to compute therefrom the total value of future
pain and suffering of the plaintiff. Courts which have rejected this
type of argument have reasoned that this practice might deceive jurors
into believing that pain and suffering, inherently immeasurable,
117 The affidavit must be offered and read into the record and is not auto-
matically a part of the record. Wilson v. Little, 293 S.W.2d 715 (Ky. 1956).118 Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Diehlman, 259 Ky. 320, 82 S.W.2d
350 (1935).
119 Boden v. Rogers, 249 S.W.2d 707 (1952).
120 The brevity of this section is no reflection upon the importance of the
topic, but is due to the fact that this topic is extensively treated in Comment, 49
Ky. L. J. 592 (1961).
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might be reduced to mathematical certainty.12 1 In Louisville & N. R.R.
Co. v. Mattingly1 22 the Kentucky Court of Appeals approved this
practice, reasoning that it would be no more speculative for counsel
to suggest a daily amount than it would be to confine suggestions to
total amounts for damages for pain and suffering. 123
The first test of any such argument will be the foundation to be
derived from the evidence introduced. In order to argue for dam-
mages for pain and suffering on a per diem basis it is necessary
that evidence be introduced that the claimant will, for some ascertain-
able future period, suffer each and every day and in roughly the
same quantum. Where it cannot be shown that the plaintiff will suf-
fer daily, or where the pain will be variable, it may be necessary for
counsel to base his argument upon some longer interval of time, such
as weekly, monthly, or annually. Thus, where counsel embarks upon
such an argument not having laid a proper foundation he is assuming
facts not shown by the record and misstating the evidence by innuendo.
Thus, an objection that the argument is outside the record would be
appropriate.
C. Race, Religion and National Origin
Considering the monumental advances which have been made in
racial relations in the past fifteen years, it would be surprising today to
find an attorney who would make an overt allusion to either race,
religion or nationality where it was not an issue in the case. Ken-
tuckians have not always been so enlightened, however, and cases
are to be found on the subject.
In Kammer-Friedman Company v. Casky,12 4 counsel for plaintiff
had characterized his clients as "high-class American citizens and not
Jews, and that plaintiffs had more character than defendants and their
counsel combined."125 In affirming the verdict for plaintiff, the court
stated that, "[t]he reference by counsel to the nationality of de-
fendants was, perhaps in bad taste, but we find nothing in the record
to indicate that such reference, did or could, have aroused the pre-
judices of the jury."12 6
In Colker v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Company, 27 counsel for de-
fendant made the statement that:
121 See, e.g., Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
322 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960).
123 Id. at 161. Approval bad previously been given to arguing the total value
of pain and suffering. Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W.2d 637
(1944).
124 216 Ky. 504, 287 S.W. 977 (1926).
125 Id. at 507, 287 S.W. at 978.
126 Id.
127 224 Ky. 837, 7 S.W.2d 502 (1928).
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'He planned the whole thing. It's a dirty nasty Jewish trick that
this criminal, convicted in the United States court, did; a criminal
who tried to cheat the government, and now trying to cheat the
fire insurance companies by a dirty Jew trick. The evidence shows
beyond a doubt that Martin was only a subterfuge, and that there
never was any Martin. Just a Jew trick of Colker and his lawyer
to cheat the government and the insurance companies... :128
Here the appeal was taken on grounds in addition to the remarks
quoted, and a reversal obtained, so it is not clear what weight the re-
marks were given in granting the reversals. The Court merely noted
that,
It was very improper for counsel in his concluding argument to
appeal to race prejudice, and while there was no exception to this
at the time, counsel did immediately move to discharge the jury,
which sufficiently raised the question. The case should have been
argued simply on the evidence before the jury. 129
No definite rule based upon these cases can be advanced, and no
similar civil authority 3 0 is to be found. Despite the decision in Colker,
the existence of other grounds for reversal makes it impossible to say
that the case has overruled Kammer-Friedman. It is submitted that the
Kammer-Friedman opinion was not carefully worded and that the
true rule is that references to race, religion or national origin are im-
proper when employed to arouse the prejudices of the jurors, but that
such references will not constitute reversible error unless prejudice is
manifested in the verdict. Thus, what the Court was probably saying
was simply that they agreed with the verdict and that the reference
had not prejudiced the defendant in that particular case.
D. Settlement Offers
It has long been an evidentiary rule that the fact that a defendant
has offered to settle the case is inadmissible.' 3' While the authorities
make convincing arguments that the basis for the rule is policy and
privilege, thus making the evidence incompetent, 13 2 the courts
128 Id. at 845, 7 S.W.2d at 505.
129 Id.
'
3 0 For cases from the criminal field, see Dotye v. Commonwealth, 289
S.W.2d 206 (Ky. 1956); Quarles v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1951);
Lickliter v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 95, 60 S.W.2d 355 (1933); Hoskins v.
Commonwealth, 152 Ky. 805, 154 S.W. 919 (1913); Norman v. Commonwealth,
31 Ky. L. Rptr. 1283, 104 S.W. 1024 (1907).
'3' T. C. Young Const. Co. v. Brown, 372 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1963); Elam v.
Woolery, 258 S.W.2d 452 (Ky. 1953); Whitney v. Penick, 281 Ky. 474, 136
S.W.2d 570 (1940); Power's Adm'r v. Wiley, 241 Ky. 645, 44 S.W.2d 591(1931); Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. O'Bannon & Co., 146 Ky. 34, 174 S.W. 783
1915); Hurst v. Williams, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 658, 102 S.W. 1176 (1907).132 Elam v. Woolery, 258 S.W.2d 452 (Ky. 1953); Simpson v. Simpson, 145
Ky. 45, 139 S.W. 1100 (1911).
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ordinarily label the reason for exclusion as irrelevancy. 133 Since the
fact is inadmissible, it follows that comment upon the fact is improper.
The problem most often faced with regard to settlement offers is not
the "black-letter" law, but its application to the particular comment.
Perhaps one of the most interesting cases on the subject is T. C.
Young Construction Company v. Brown.'34 There, counsel for the
plaintiff disclosed to the jury that he had been "negotiating" with
counsel for defendant for several months. After recognizing the
evidentiary rule, the court stated:
The word 'negotiating' as used by counsel in this case certainly
bore a connotation that falls within the proscription, and the re-
mark was improper. However, we are not persuaded that it was
prejudicial. Though often confounded by their decisions, we can-
not assume that jurors are simpletons. It is common knowledge
that efforts are made to settle practically all sizeable law-
suits. This does not make it a proper subject of discussion, but
it does minimize the possibility of prejudice from its mere mention
without disclosure of any harmful details. We do not believe that
the statement was so damaging as not to be correctable by
admonition. 135
This appears to be a realistic approach to the substantiality of the
error and is not difficult to reconcile with earlier decisions which
indicated that any mention whatsoever might require reversal. Thus,
even though the Court stated in Elam v. Woolery136 that "[t]he rule
is a salutary one and should not be whittled away by qualifications
or exceptions," 137 the facts shown by the opinion indicate that the
quantum of the settlement offer was indicated, thus making the broad
statement quoted technically dicta.
Another such case is Whitney v. Penick,18 where the propriety of
a direct question to the plaintiff and a comment in argument was
passed upon after reversing on other grounds. While the court indi-
cated that the evidence was inadmissible and the comment improper,
it never reached the question of whether it would have been reversible
error in itself.
In the recent case of Wolf Creek Collieries Company v. Davis,139
the injection of settlement offers was held to be reversible error.
Here there was a factor of "culpability," which is frequently found but
1334 J. WMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1061(c) (1940). Contra C. McCoRAiicK,
EVIDENC E § 76 (1954).
134 372 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1963).
135 Id. at 674.
136 258 S.W.2d 452 (Ky. 1953).
137 Id. at 454.138 281 Ky. 474, 136 S.W.2d 570 (1940).
139 441 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1969).
[Vol. 58
always difficult to treat. While the subjective intent of the person
making the improper statement does not appear to be relevant, the
objective manifestation of prejudice being the ultimate question, it
nevertheless appears that culpability is considered in conjunction with
objective evidence, the record, and the verdict. In Wolf Creek Col-
lieries, attempts to introduce the settlement offers were made no less
than five times and there can be little doubt that this was a factor
which induced the Court to reverse. 140
The rule appears to be clear, therefore, that evidence of attempted
compromise, or actual compromise with a third party,141 is not admis-
sible, and that no such comment should be made by counsel. One
who defies the rule, ordinarily a plaintiff, will thereby lose his
opportunity to recover a truly adequate award, for a large award will
be excellent evidence that the impermissible introduction was indeed
prejudicial.
E. Insurance
That a defendant to an action is protected by liability insurance
may be improperly injected into a trial in several ways: during voir
dire; in opening statement; through examination of a witness; and, in
summation. Ordinarily, whether or not the defendant is insured is ir-
relevant 142 or incompetent,143 and, as a result, the general rule has
evolved that it is improper for counsel to comment'" or to elict com-
mentl45 that the defendant is insured, and it may be reversible error for
him to do so.146
There are, however, many circumstances under which an injection
of insurance into the case will not be irrelevant or improper. The most
obvious cases are where the insurance company is named as a party47
or where counsel for the insurance company elects to make the dis-
closure.148 Other circumstances require more consideration.
A plaintiff will generally find it in his best interests to discover and
to strike from the jury any veniremen who have an interest in an
insurance company and who would be affected by a verdict adverse to
the defendant's insurer. This is deemed by the courts to be a justifiable
140 Id. at 402.
1
41 Ferry's Adm'r v. Louisville Ry. Co., 165 Ky. 747, 178 S.W. 1087 (1915).
142 Trevillian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237, 43 S.W.2d 715 (1931).
143 Danville Light, Power & Traction Co. v. Baldwin, 178 Ky. 184, 198
S.W. 713 (1917).
'
4 4 Tuin v. Scrivner, 297 Ky. 365, 178 S.W.2d 971 (1944).
14 H atliff, 312 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1958).
140 Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co. v. Duganics, 113 S.W. 128 (Ky. 1908).
'
47 Dunaway v. Darnell, 302 S.W.2d 122 (Ky. 1957).
148 See note 83 supra.
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interest 149 and has given rise to the first exception to the general rule.
Thus, plaintiffs counsel may inquire into a juror's interest in insurance
companies where he in good faith believes that the juror may have an
interest in the defendant's insurer.'5 ° Good faith may be founded
upon answers of the veniremen' 51 or upon other information held by
counsel. 15 2 An example of questions becoming permissible upon an
answer of a venireman is the case of Bourland v. Mitchell15 3 where
the potential juror gave his occupation as an insurance agent. It was
held permissible for counsel to then inquire as to whether the juror
had written insurance policies for the defendant. The answer that he
had written only fire insurance for the defendant was held not to
erroneously prejudice the defendant. 54
An example of the second basis for good faith is found in the
case of Hoagland v. Dolan"' where counsel for plaintiff asked, "Are
any of you gentlemen at the present time employed by, or interested
in, any insurance company whose business is to insure automobiles
against personal injury of the owner?"156 Here the trial court overruled
objections to the question and motions to dismiss, and apparently no
avowal was made. The Court of Appeals relied upon Dow Wire
Works Company v. Morgan'57 in holding that the absence of a showing
of good faith was to be construed in favor of the propounder of the
question and assumed.
Another example is found in Helton v. Praters Administrator5 8
where counsel for plaintiff asked the following question:
'Gentlemen of the jury, are any of you at the present time em-
ployed by, or interested in, or have any policy of insurance in, or
stockholder in, the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Coin-
'49 Bourland v. Mitchell, 835 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1960); Ewing-Von Allmen
Dairy Co. v. Godwin, 304 Ky. 161, 200 S.W.2d 103 (1947); Abell v. Whitehead,
266 Ky. 764, 99 S.W.2d 770 (1937).
150 Potter v. Trent, 262 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1953); Helton v. Praters Adm'r,
272 Ky. 574, 114 S.W.2d 1120 (1938); Abell v. Whitehead, 266 Ky. 764, 99
S.W.2d 770 (1937); Hoagland v. Dolan, 259 Ky. 1, 81 S.W.2d 869 (1935);
Hedger v. Davis, 236 Ky. 432, 33 S.W.2d 310 (1930); Ashland Sanitary Milk
Co. v. Messersmiths Adm'r, 236 Ky. 91, 32 S.W.2d 727 (1930); W. G. Duncan
Coal Co. v. Thompson's Adm'r, 157 Ky. 304, 162 S.W. 1139 (1914).
151 Insko v. Cummins, 423 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1968); Bourland v. Mitchell,
335 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1960); Ashland Sanitary Milk Co. v. Messersmithas Admr,
236 Ky. 91, 32 S.W.2d 727 (1930).
152 Ewing-Von Allman Dairy Co. v. Codwin, 304 Ky. 161, 200 S.W.2d 103
(1947); Helton v. Prater's Adm'r, 272 Ky. 574, 114 S.W.2d 1120 (1938).
153 335 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1960).
154 Id. at 569.
'55 259 Ky. 1, 81 S.W.2d 869 (1935).
35o Id. at 870.
15729 Ky. L. Rptr. 854, 96 S.W. 530 (1906).
158272 Ky. 574, 114 S.W.2d 1120 (1938).
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pany of Bloomington, Illinois, whose business is to insure auto-
mobile against personal injury by the owner?" 59
It is difficult to conceive a question more likely to put before the jury
the fact that the defendant was insured by a foreign insurance
company. When plaintiff's counsel was called upon to show his good
faith in propounding the question, he avowed that the insurance
company named was conducting the defense for the defendant, that
he believed that there were jurors on the panel who had insurance
policies of the same character in the company, that the company was
a mutual insurance company, and that all policy holders had a right
to vote at stockholders meeting. 160 Here was a question quite similar
to that in Hoagland v. Dolan,'6' and an avowal more pervasive than
that stated to be required by that case, 62 but one in which an ad-
ditional factor dictated a contrary result. Here counsel for plaintiff
made the mistake of also referring to insurance in his summation,' 63
and the court found this sufficient to impute to his prior question the
stigma of bad faith. This enabled the Court to avoid ever reaching
the question whether the voir dire alone would have been improper.
The next stage in which insurance may be mentioned without
creating error is in the opening statement, where evidence to be
presented necessitates a showing of insurance. Examples of this are
where insurance may be evidence of ownership of property, 64 em-
ployment,1 5 or business connection. 66 Here the evidence should be
treated as any other, and counsel must take care not to indicate that he
is introducing it for any purpose other than that stated. 67 Thus, while
it is permissible to mention insurance as evidence of a fact in issue, it
would be improper to comment upon its indemnification features.
In addition to the same principles just stated with respect to
opening statement, insurance may be injected into the trial at the time
of presentation of evidence by means of cross-examination of wit-
nesses. This would be true where it is necessary to impeach a witness
'59 Id. at 1122.
160 Id.
161259 Ky. 1, 81 S.W.2d 869 (1935).
162 Id. at 871.
163 272 Ky. 574, 576, 114 S.W.2d 1120, 1122 (1938).
164 Cayheart v. Smith, 240 Ky. 598, 42 S.W.2d 877 (1931).
105 Triplett v. Napier, 286 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1956)- Silver Fleet Motor Ex-
press v. Gilbert, 291 Ky. 696, 165 S.W.2d 541 (1942); Hedger v. Davis, 236
Ky. 432, 33 S.W.2d 310 (1930); Coral Ridge Clay Products Co. v. Collins, 181
Ky. 818, 205 S.W. 958 (1918).6N Trevfllian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237, 43 S.W.2d 715 (1931).
167 Croley v. Huddleston, 301 Ky. 582, 192 S.W.2d 717 (1946); Silver
Fleet Motor Express v. Gilbert, 291 Ky. 696, 165 S.W.2d 541 (1942); Helton v.
Prater's Adm'r, 272 Ky. 574, 114 S.W.2d 1120 (1938).
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by showing that he is an employee'08 of an insurance company having
an interest in the litigation or that he is aware that he has some other
interest in such a company.169
Where insurance has become an issue for evidentiary or impeach-
ment purposes, it becomes a legitimate subject for comment in sum-
mation for the purpose for which it was introduced 70 One could not,
for example, introduce insurance into the case for impeachment pur-
poses and then make the illogical argument that people admit a
propensity toward negligence by insuring themselves. It is the re-
jection of this very argument which makes the fact that a party is
insured irrelevant.
F. Arguing the "Golden Rule"
"Golden Rule" arguments are those in which counsel requests of
the jurors that they do for his client what they would like done for
them under similar circumstances. It is an attempt to get the jurors
to associate and sympathize with the party. These arguments are
improper because they suggest to the jurors improper criteria for
finding liability' 7' and are especially improper as offering the criteria
for measurement of damages. 7 2
An example of this type of argument is found in the 1931 case of
Southern-Harlan Coal Company v. Gallaier1'73 where the plaintiff's
counsel asked the jurors to return a verdict for the plaintiff as if he
were their son.'7 4 Here the argument of counsel consisted of several
other improper references and it appears that the Court leaned more
heavily upon references to wealth and poverty than upon the "Golden
Rule" in condemning the argument.
Another example is found in J. J. Newberry Company v. Judd,175
a false imprisonment case, in which "counsel for plaintiff stated the
jury 'in fixing the amount of damages should endeavor to contemplate
their wife or sister or daughter being in a similar situation.'"176
168 See cases cited at note 165, supra.
169 Trevillian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237, 43 S.W.2d 715 (1932).
170 See cases cited at note 167, supra.
171 The "Golden Rule" should be less effective here than as an influence on
the quantum of damages. Passion and prejudice are less likely to be aroused to in-
fluence the finding of liability.
172 Applying the "Golden Rule" to arguments on damages is likely to be
effective. This is because some degree of introspection will take place in any
deliberation where pain and suffering are considered. "Golden Rule arguments
urge jurors to directly apply the product of the introspection, while the law
dictates that it should only be used as a guide to finding the plaintiffs damages.
173 240 Ky. 106, 41 S.W.2d 661 (1931).
174 Id. at 111, 41 S.W.2d at 663.
175 259 Ky. 309, 82 S.W.2d 359 (1935).
176 Id. at 319, 82 S.W.2d at 364.
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Here the Court held such argument improper but found it not to be
prejudicial "upon a consideration of the whole case."177 Here the court
cited the Southern Harlan Coal Company178 case for the proposition
that "Golden Rule" arguments are improper, but again it is not pos-
sible to say that such argument could be ground for reversal in itself.
In Murphy v. Cordle,"79 counsel for plaintiff called upon the jury to
make the "rich defendants pay" and called upon them to render such
a verdict as they would be willing to take to have scars on their child
or on themselves through life. 80 Again the improper comment con-
tained other grounds of impropriety' 8' and it is not clear whether the
"Golden Rule" argument alone would have been sufficient for reversal.
Another type of "Golden Rule" argument that has been deemed
improper is exemplified by the case of Lanning v. Brown 8 2 in which
counsel for the plaintiff stated that "... I wouldn't suffer the pain
she's going through for fifty dollars a day," that "... I don't think
(counsel for defendant) would go through this for fifty dollars a day,"
and that "I don't think anybody would take any money to go through
the suffering she's got."18 3 Here the comment was ruled to be
improper but not prejudicial in view of the reasonableness of the
verdict.
In the 1964 case of Stanley v. Ellegood,184 the impropriety of such
an argument was faced where it was not merely incidental to other
improper argument. There counsel for plaintiff asked of the jurors,
'Vhat would you take for ten days of that?" He went on. to state that
he believed "that you will treat him like you would want to be
treated:'185
Granted that an argument was improper, the difficult question
nearly always is whether the probability of real prejudice from it is
sufficient to warrant a reversal, and in this respect each case
must be judged on its own unique facts. An isolated instance of
improper argument, for example, will seldom be found prejudicial.
[Citations omitted.] But when it is repeated and reiterated in
colorful variety by an accomplished orator its deadly effect cannot
be ignored.
In some cases the court has declined to find that improper
remarks were prejudicial in view of the modest or conservative
177 Id.
178 240 Ky. 106, 41 S.W.2d 661 (1931).
179 303 Ky. 229, 197 S.W.2d 242 (1946).
180 Id. at 231, 197 S.W.2d at 243.
181 Id., et seq.
182 377 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1964).
183 Id. at 595.
184 382 S.W.2d 572 (Ky. 1964).
185 Id. at 574-75.
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amount of the verdict. [Citations omitted.] In this case, it is not
suggested that the verdict was 'excessive.' Yet it was quite sub-
stantial in comparison with the verdicts in the examples just
cited, and certainly we are unable to say that it negates the
probability of prejudicial influence by the improper argument.
On the whole, it is our judgment that the remarks above quoted
were improper and prejudicial, requiring reversal for a new
trial .... 186
G. Prejudice Against Corporations
Appeals to prejudice against corporations are basically of two types:
references to the wealth of the corporation, and references to the
soullessness of corporations. The first of these is no different from a
reference to the wealth of a party who is an individual. This type of
argument is considered elsewhere 8 7 and it will suffice here to state that
it is improper to inject into the trial that the corporation is large and
successful.
The only comment which will apply purely to corporations is a
comment upon its soullessness. An excellent example of this type of
argument is found in the case of Carter Coal Company v. Hill'88 where
counsel for plaintiff stated, "Go out and bring in a verdict here against
this wicked, soulless corporation-this thing that's got no life, that
you can't hurt and that can't feel."1 89 The corporation felt the sting of
a verdict for the plaintiff but its "painless" wound was healed by the
ultimate reversal.
Normally, all veniremen who have an interest in a corporation
which is a party will be struck.190 For some unexplainable reason, those
jurors remaining apparently will never consider that the corporation
is owned by "souled," and not necessarily "heeled," individuals. 91
Perhaps we are underestimating jurors' intelligence and integrity.
Nevertheless, it has long been established that it is improper to refer
to this aspect of Corporation existence.192 It must be agreed, however,
that whether a party is or is not a corporation is most often totally
186 Id. at 575.
187 See the discussion under Financial Status of a Party, infra.
188 166 Ky. 213, 179 S.W. 2 (1915).
189 Id. at 218, 179 S.W. at 4.
190 Hess' Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 249 Ky. 624, 61 S.W.2d 299
1933); McLaughlin v. Louisville Elec. Light Co., 100 Ky. 173, 37 S.W. 851
1896).
191 But see Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Crow 82 Ky. L. Rptr. 1145, 107
S.W. 807 (1908), where the wealth of the shareholders was argued.
192 Southern-Harlan Coal Co. v. Gallaier, 240 Ky. 106, 41 S.W.2d 661
1931); Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Garon, 233 Ky. 464, 26 S.W.2d 20
1930); Carter Coal Co. v. Hill, 166 Ky. 213, 179 S.W. 2 (1915).
[Vol. 58
irrelevant. As always, it is necessary to define the purpose of the
statement 93 and its probable effect on the jury's decision. 9 4
Some have considered allegations of coercion of employees to
testify and comments on trial and pre-trial tactics of an opponent to
be "corporations" 195 comments. These, like references to wealth, are not
necessarily peculiar to corporate parties but are peculiar to employers
and parties generally.
H. Financial Status Of a Party
Neither poverty on the part of a plaintiff nor wealth on the part of
a defendant constitutes a claim for relief. Conversely, neither wealth
of a plaintiff nor poverty of a defendant is a legally recognized de-
fense. While it is conceivable that the financial status of either a
plaintiff' 96 or a defendant'9 7 might be in issue, this ordinarily will not
be the case and these facts will be irrelevant. Irrelevancy has not,
however, prevented argument to the jury.
Often the incident on which the suit is based has caused the
plaintiff to incur medical expenses and lose time from work, which
would result in financial difficulty for most people; and it is under
these circumstances that plaintiffs attorneys are most prone to argue
the poverty of their clients. Despite the apparent nexus, the effect of
the damages upon'the particular plaintiff must be distinguished from
the compensable damages, because in theory an award of the actual
immediate damages is full compensation. Clearly, the amount of a
person's net worth immediately preceeding an injury should not affect
the damages resulting from the injury in any way. This is the position
the Court has taken and it has been held that to argue the poverty
of the plaintiff is improper.198
From the foregoing must be distinguished two common types of
103 Brown-McClain Trans. Co. v. Major's Adm'r, 251 Ky. 741, 65 S.W.2d
992 (1933).
194 In Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (1960), the
Court failed to find the disclosure prejudicial to the defendant as it was a matter
of common knowledge.
195 See Comment, 19 ALA. L. BEy. 75, 87, 88-90 (1966).
190 A plaintiff's financial status might be in issue in a suit to obtain public
assistance. This would not be an action triable before a jury, however, being an
appeal from administrative action on a question of law.
197 A demand for punitive damages puts the defendant's financial status in
issue.
108 Carpenter v. Galloway, 344 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1961); Southem-Harlan
Coal Co. v. Gallaier, 240 Ky. 106 41 S.W.2d 661 (1931); Sparks v. Maeschal,
217 Ky. 235, 289 S.W. 308 (1926J; Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Bumpass' Adm'r, 195
Ky. 453, 243 S.W. 32 (1922); Illinois C. Ry. Co. v. Proctor, 122 Ky. 92, 89




arguments: (1) that the injury has been the proximate cause of the
loss of the capacity to earn money; and (2) the actual physical condi-
tion of .the plaintiff. The first of these is an element of compensable
damages, 19 9 and the extent to which a plaintiff can no longer earn
money is in issue. But there is a great deal of difference in the state-
ments: "The plaintiff cannot earn money," and, "The plaintiff has no
money." The latter can serve no useful purpose other than an appeal
for sympathy.
A comment upon the actual physical condition of the plaintiff is
usually justified in a personal injury case as it is this evidence upon
which the determination of permanent injuries must be made.200 But
the same argument would be impermissible in any other type of
action.
The same considerations have prevailed where counsel has argued
the wealth of the defendant. Where financial worth of a defendant is
not in issue, his ability to pay an award is irrelevant.201 This rule ap-
plies whether the defendant is an individual202 or a corporation,203
although the latter appears to be more often the target of such
argument. This is probably one of the most violated rules of argument
and an area in which counsel have waxed eloquent. Arguments have
been made that the jury should "[g]ive us as much as a railroad
magnate would spend for a rosebud, give us as much as one of these
magnates would tip a waiter,"20 4 and that "[y] ou can take from this
corporation its hoarded thousands and millions, and you can't pay
this man for these wails and pains and agonies he has suffered."20 5
Another interesting appeal was:
He may live in a magnificent home, surrounded and furnished
with beautiful furniture, the floors of which are covered with
oriental rugs, the grandeur of which are beyond our most ex-
travagent imagination, but the little home of Phillip King by the
side of the road and his power to earn money for his little family
199W. A. Wickliffe Coal Co. v. Ryan, 241 Ky. 537, 44 S.W.2d 525 (1931);
Jones Savage Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 233 Ky. 198, 25 S.W.2d 373 (1930).200 Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960).
201 Coomb's Adm'r v. Vibbert, 289 Ky. 463, 158 S.W.2d 957 (1941); Singer
Sewing Machine Co. v. Dyer, 156 Ky. 156, 160 S.W. 917 (1913).
202 Wright's Ex'r v. Craft, 309 Ky. 198, 217 S.W.2d 228 (1949); Coomb's
Adm'r v. Vibbert, 289 Ky. 463, 158 S.W.2d 957 (1941); Wells v. King, 219 Ky.
201, 292 S.W. 777 (1927).
203 Murphy v. Cordle, 303 Ky. 229, 197 S.W.2d 242 (1946); Sparks v.
Maeschal, 217 Ky. 235, 289 S.W. 308 (1926); Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Bumpass'
Adrm'r, 195 Ky. 453, 243 S.W. 32 (1922); Carter Coal Co. v. Hill, 166 Ky. 213,
179 S.W. 2 (1915); Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Payne, 138 Ky. 274, 127 S.W.
993 (1910).20 4 Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Payne, 138 Ky. 274, 275, 127 S.W. 993, 994
(1910).
205 Carter Coal Co. v. Hill, 166 Ky. 213, 216, 179 S.W.2d 2, 4 (1915).
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are as sweet to him as it is to any man who lives in a mansion or
drives a car along this highway.206
As this is a commonly understood rule, it should suffice to say that
more subtle references are also condemned.
I. Punitive Damages
In considering punitive damages as a topic of argument our usual
analysis must shift from admissibility of evidence and the record to
a consideration of the instructions. Again, of course, there must be
admissible evidence in the record to support the comment, but there
must also be a decision by the trial judge that the case is appropriate
for an instruction on punitive damages. Where the judge denies such
an offered instruction, whether erroneously or not, no argument may
be made for punitive damages. 20 7 Actually, this rule prevails no mat-
ter what comment is being considered, but it is punitive damages
which bring the principle to the fore. Stated in another way which we
shall consider shortly, counsel may not argue to the jury that they
should ignore the instructions and decide the case on some other
basis.208
This leads us to the most common problem in this area-the re-
quest for actual damages to punish. The usual import of such argu-
ments is that the measure of damages should be based upon the cul-
pability of the defendant rather than upon the evidence of damages.
An example of this is found in the 1902 case of Louisville, H. & St. L.
Ry. Company v. Chandler's Administrator2 9 where counsel asked that
the jury "render such a verdict here as will teach this railroad company
that it can not violate the law . .. ,210 Reasoning in a manner not
destined to prevail, the Court stated:
In this case it is certain that the attorney did not undertake to
state any fact bearing upon the case on trial, nor did he attempt to
state any proposition of law that should govern the case. It was
simply an appeal to the jury to render such a verdict as would
teach the appellant to obey the law. Surely every one ought to
obey the law. 211
In Weil v. Hagan,212 counsel for plaintiff appealed to the jury:
200 Wells v. King, 219 Ky. 201, 204, 292 S.W. 777, 778 (1927).
207 Louisvile Woolen Mills v. Kindgen, 196 Ky. 568, 231 S.W. 202 (1921);
Harrison v. Park, 24 Ky. (1 J. J. Marsh.) 170 (1829); Smith v. Morrison, 10 Ky.(3 A.K. Marsh.) 81 (1820).
-08 See the discussion of comments upon the instructions, infra.
20924 Ky. L. Rptr. 998, 70 S.W. 666 (1902).
2 10 Id. at 1001, 70 S.W. at 667.
211 Id.
212 161 Ky. 292, 170 S.W. 618 (1914).
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You should find a verdict against the defendants in order to pro-
tect the lives of citizens in traveling on the highway, and that
would be a warning to the drivers of automobiles on the high-
way. 213
Here hte Court analyzed the argument in terms of the measure of
damages and found that
[w]here an automobile owner or driver is negligent and injures
another, he should answer only for the reasonable consequences
of his own acts. He should not be mulcted in damages in order
that a verdict in his case might operate as a warning to others. 214
This reasoning has prevailed and it is improper to appeal to the
jurors to render a verdict to punish the defendant or to serve as a
warning to others.2 15
What might be considered the converse of the rule of Weil v. Hagan
is to be found in Colker v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Company216
where the defendant sought to have his liability mitigated because
the plaintiff had been convicted for operating an illicit still in the in-
sured building. This, among other comments, was deemed improper.
I. Comments Upon Objections and Rulings
It is fundamental that objections raise questions of law of which
the judge is the proper arbiter,2 17 the jury being the proper body to
determine the facts of the case.21s It should be clear, then, that the
theory of an objection should not be debated to the jury. On occasion,
however, counsel have been moved to argue the propriety of a ruling
of the court to the jury.210 It is difficult to see, however, why such an
argument should be reversible error in itself. In the first instance, the
argument of abstract legal theory should result in a little more than
confusion in the minds of the jurors but may be objectionable as an
appeal to disregard the instructions.220
213 Id. at 293, 170 S.W. at 619.
214 Id. at 294, 170 S.W. at 619.
215 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Byars 240 Ky. 500, 42 S.W.2d 719(1931);
Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Carnon, 233 Ky. 464, 26 S.W.2d 20 (1930);
Standard Mfg. Co. v. Brian's Adm'r, 224 Ky. 419, 6 S.W.2d 491 (1928); Weit
v. Hagan, 161 Ky. 292, 170 S.W. 618 (1914).
216 224 Ky. 837, 7 S.W.2d 502 (1928).
217 Horton Transfer & Storage Co. v. Donaldson, 265 Ky. 47, 95 S.W.2d
1086 (1936).
218 Morton's Adm'r v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 282 Ky. 174,
138 S.W.2d 345 (1940); Barnett v. Gilbert, 280 Ky. 402, 133 S.W.2d 529 (1939);
Horton Transfer & Storage Co. v. Donaldson, 265 Ky. 47, 95 S.W.2d 1086 (1936);
Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Naifeh, 229 Ky. 293, 16 S.W.2d 1086 (1936); Forbes
v. Hunter, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 285, 102 S.W. 246 (1907).
219 Louisville Woolen Mils v. Kindgen, 191 Ky. 568, 231 S.W. 202 (1921).
220 Thomas v. Smith, 302 Ky. 636, 195 S.W.2d 274 (1946). See the considera-
tion of comments on instructions infra.
[Vol. 58
Noms
On the other hand, where the argument is directed to the evidence
occasioning the objection, which may be inevitable in every instance,
two situations are possible: counsel may argue that his objection
should not have been overruled; counsel may argue that the op-
ponent's objection should not have been sustained. In the first instance,
with notable exceptions such as privileges, counsel will ordinarily
simply be arguing that the evidence should be given no weight, and
this should be given the same treatment as comments upon other,
proper evidence.
In the second instance, counsers argument will be objectionable on
the ground that it states and comments upon facts not in evidence, 221
logically a separate and distinct ground. A second objection would be
that the argument injects into the trial improper considerations. 222
Argument that the court was correct in excluding offered evidence,
and stating the excluded evidence while admitting its inadmissibility,
is equally objectionable. 223 Here the attempted "end run" around the
ruling of the court achieves the same objective that was objectionable
in the first instance-exposing to the jurors improper evidence.
In any of the situations cited, such disrespect for the trial judge
should, it is submitted, subject the attorney to reprimand. It should
be pointed out that the new Canons of Ethics specifically provide for
such instances by stating that "... . a lawyer should not by subterfuge
put before a jury matters which it cannot properly consider."224 None-
theless, we must here contend that it adds nothing but confusion to the
law to make such comments error in themselves without consideration
of the practical consequences of the actual comment.
A second type of comment on objections is comment upon the
mere fact of objecting with no reference to the matter objected to or
to the ruling. Here it is permissible to make reference to the many
objections made by the party making the reference where this is
actually borne out by the record.225 The same rule should apply where
the objections were made by the opposing party. In both instances,
it should not be improper to point out to the jury the proper manner
in which the trial had been conducted.
The point may be reached, however, where such comments become
improper as disparaging remarks upon the character of opposing
2 2 1 Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Gregory, 284 Ky. 297, 144 S.W.2d 519 (1940);
Bonta v. Bonta, 175 Ky. 26, 193 S.W. 648 (1917).222 Gunterman v. Cleaver, 204 Ky. 62, 263 S.W. 683 (1924); Bonta v. Bonta,
175 Ky. 26, 193 S.W. 648 (1917).223 McHenry Coal Co. v. Sneddon, 98 Ky. 684, 34 S.W. 228 (1896).2 24ABA CANONS OF POFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration
7-25 (1970).
225 Reed v. Hostetler, 245 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1952).
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counsel. Thus, where the comment suggests that opposing counsel
repeatedly attempted to introduce improper evidence for improper
purposes, it approaches a request for the jury to penalize the op-
posing party for his misconduct.226 Where counsel comments upon the
many objections to his own offers of evidence, the comment may be
construed as an implication that the opposing party has something to
hide,227 or may even imply that objections themselves are under-
handed tactics.
228
Yet another type of comment which has been condemned is argu-
ment that a ruling "proves" one's case. This is the situation where
counsel argues that his success in resisting a motion for a directed
verdict means that his client has a right to recover. The ruling does
not mean this at all, but merely means that there is a question of fact
for the jury to determine and such perversion of the law in sum-
mation is improper.
2 29
V. Tim REPLY Docriupm
No discussion of permissible comment can be completed without
consideration of the reply doctrine. This rule provides that otherwise
improper comments will not be a ground for reversal if made merely
in reply to an improper comment by opposing counsel.230 There are
several facets to this rule which need to be explored.
First, the mere fact that an improper comment is in reply to a
previous improper comment does not make the second comment any
less objectionable. 231 The offended party may object and obtain an
admonition to the jury.232 The important feature of the rule is that an
admonition should be the only remedy available as it will be assumed
that the error created by the improper reply will be cured by the
226 Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Gregory, 284 Ky. 297, 144 S.W.2d 519 (1940).
227 Southern-Harlan Coal Co. v. Gallaier, 240 Ky. 106, 41 S.W.2d 661 (1931).
228 Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Gregory, 284 Ky. 297, 144 S.W.2d 519 (1940);
Sacre v. Louisville Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 473, 153 S.W. 760 (1913).
229 Scudamore v. Horton, 426 S.W.2d 142 (Ky. 1968).
230 Moore v. Lyons, 386 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1965); Lanning v. Brown, 377
S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1964); Aker v. Smith, 290 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1956); Guyan
Chevrolet Co. v. Dillow, 264 Ky. 812, 95 S.W.2d 796 (1936): Warfield Natural
Gas Co. v. Clark's Adm'x, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S.W.2d 21 (1935); Woltering v.
Weber's Adm'x, 253 Ky. 55, 68 S.W.2d 440 (1934); Louisville Ry. Co. v. Farmer,
182 Ky. 368, 206 S.W. 619 (1918); Evans Chem. Works v. Ball, 159 Ky. 399,
167 S.W. 390 (1914); Illinois C. Ry. Co. v. Colly, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 730, 86
S.W. 536 (1905).231 Lanning v. Brown, 377 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1964); Guyan Chevrolet Co. v.
Dillow, 264 Ky. 812, 95 S.W.2d 796 (1936); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Clark's
Adm'x, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S.W.2d 21 (1935).282 Louisville Ry. Co. v. Farmer, 182 Ky. 368, 206 S.W. 619 (1918).
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admonition.23 3 Where the reply conforms to the rules next to be
considered, no mistrial, new trial, or reversal should be granted.
Secondly, an obvious rule is that the comment must be pertinent
to the previous comment to which it purports to be a reply.2 3 4 One
may not, for example, latch on to an improper comment upon the
character of a witness to inject into the case that the defendant is in-
sured or to argue the "Golden Rule."
Some courts appear to have ranked improper comments in order of
importance and restrict replies to the same degree of error as the
initial improper comment.235 Thus, an "improper" comment may not
be answered with a comment which is deemed to be "grossly im-
proper." It does not appear that Kentucky has recognized this dis-
tinction explicitly, but the language of Evans Chemical Works v.
Bal 230 can certainly be read to mean that this is the actual practice of
the Court. The appellee should take care to include in the certified
record the improper comment and attending circumstances provoking
his reply.237
VI. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it appears that objections to comments may be
founded upon various theories, and that the objection preferred may
depend upon the time in the trial when the comment was made. As
the basic objections were considered earlier, we shall dwell here for
a moment on the "mental set" of counsel at the different stages of the
trial.
In making and hearing the voir dire and the opening statement
counsel should keep two questions in mind: Would the rules of
evidence allow admission of the subject of a statement; and, is this
the type of statement which may be made at this stage of trial?
When evidence is being presented, counsel should concentrate on
the rules of evidence and apply them both to the evidence offered
and the attending comments.
Once the parties have rested, counsel must shift his train of
thought. Here there are again two primary questions to be kept in
mind: Is the statement on evidence shown by the record; and, if the
statement is upon the record, is the evidence being used for the
purpose for which it was introduced?
233 Id
234 Id.; Evans Chem. Works v. Ball, 159 Ky. 399, 167 S.W. 390 (1914).
235 Comment, 19 ALA. L. REv. 75 (1966).
236 159 Ky. 399, 167 S.W. 390 (1914).237 In the Evans Chem. Works case the Court assumed the reply to be ap-
propriate due to an absence of the original statement by which to test the latter.
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No special mention has been made of misstatement of the law. This
is a readily recognizable problem which may arise at any stage and
on which counsel will already be well versed.
Throughout this note we have quoted improper comments liberally
in order to more clearly point out the objectionability of them. To
those who made them we are indebted for the warnings. To those who
intended to make them tomorrow we repeat them.
Jerry Lee Foster
